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Family Law. Janson v. Janson, 773 A.2d 901 (R.I. 2001). Hus-
band's eligibility to retire entitled wife to collect her share of hus-
band's pension as if he had actually retired, and correct valuation
of pension plan assets to be based on the date of the final divorce
decree, not the date of the property-settlement agreement.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On July 3, 1995, John H. Janson (husband) filed a marriage
dissolution action against his wife, Patricia J. Janson (wife).' In
January of 1998, the Jansons reached a property-settlement agree-
ment, which in May of 1998 was embodied in an amended decision
pending entry of a final judgment.2 In addition to custody and visi-
tation arrangements for a minor child, the agreement divided the
husband's pension benefits so that the husband would retain sixty
percent while the wife would be awarded forty percent.3 The bene-
fits would be disbursed to the parties pursuant to a qualified do-
mestic relations order (QDRO). 4
On July 6, 1999, the husband filed a motion seeking to enter
the final judgment and to execute the QDRO.5 Because the wife
claimed that the husband was eligible to retire as of May 1999, the
wife filed a motion to collect her portion of the pension benefits and
also sought to extend the QDRO to cover benefits the husband
earned from the inception of his employment through the date of
the final judgment of divorce rather than the date of the property-
settlement. 6 Following the arguments of counsel, the family court
granted the husband's motion and entered the final judgment of
divorce and QDRO on August 3, 1999, but the court did not rule on
the wife's motion.7 Following this judgment the wife filed a timely
notice of appeal.8
On appeal, the supreme court remanded the matter to the
Family Court because that court did not address the wife's motion
to expand the QDRO. 9 On remand, the family court denied the










wife's motion and the wife again appealed, arguing that the family
court's refusal to address her motion and its order to execute the
QDRO was reversible error.' 0
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The wife argued that she was entitled to her share of the pen-
sion benefits because the husband became eligible for retirement
and acquired the right to collect pension benefits in May 1999, a
right he did not possess on the date of the property-settlement
agreement." Since the property-settlement agreement was silent
as to the date the wife would be eligible to begin collecting the pen-
sion benefits, the supreme court found that the family court should
have made a determination of the correct date. The trial court
should make this determination based upon a reading of the unam-
biguous portions of the property-settlement agreement and princi-
ples of equitable distribution. The court was critical of the trial
court's failure to address the date of benefit distribution without
either explanation or justification. 12
Relying on two previous decisions, the court held that an em-
ployee/spouse could not deprive a non-employee/spouse a portion of
a property-settlement once the family court had decided to award
the non-employee/spouse that property.' 3 Secondly, the Family
Court had the authority to distribute to the non-employee/spouse
an equitable share of monthly pension benefits equal to what the
employee/spouse would have received if that spouse had retired.' 4
The sum of those holdings indicated that in the Janson's case, the
wife was rightly entitled to receive her share of pension benefits as
if the husband had retired in May 1999, when he became eligible to
do so.' 5
The wife also contended that the pension should be valued
from the date her husband commenced his employment through
the date of the final judgment of divorce, not the date the property-
settlement was entered, as the trial judge had found. 16 Agreeing
10. Id. at 903.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 904 (citing Furia v. Furia, 638 A.2d 548, 553 (R.I. 1994)).
14. Id. at 903 (citing Furia v. Furia, 692 A.2d 327, 328 (R.I. 1997)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 904-05.
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with the wife's argument, the supreme court held that from the
date of the property-settlement to the date of the final judgment of
divorce, the parties were still married and therefore maintained a
continuing interest in each other's estate. 17 Because the settle-
ment agreement contained no stipulation to the contrary, the cor-
rect valuation of the pension shares was from the time the
employee spouse commenced employment to the time the parties
were officially divorced.' 8
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, vacating and remanding
the decision of the family court, held that the date on which the
wife should begin to receive her portion of her husband's pension
benefits was the date on which he was first eligible to retire. Sec-
ondly, the correct valuation of the pension as a whole was the du-






Family Law. Rubino v. Rubino, 765 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 2001). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the family court's granting
of a divorce order and held that the equitable distribution statute,
and not an antenuptial agreement, determines the rights and lia-
bilities of the parties. The supreme court held that ex-wife had not
abandoned her rights under the antenuptial agreement and that
the terms of the agreement still governed despite her filing a mo-
tion for temporary orders and accepting cash from the parties' joint
account as an advance equitable distribution of marital assets.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Michael (plaintiff) and Donna (defendant) Rubino were mar-
ried on December 19, 1997, just two days after executing an ante-
nuptial agreement.' The agreement provided that in the event of
divorce all assets acquired by the parties as joint tenants would be
divided equally between the parties. 2 Individually owned assets
and any future individual acquisitions would remain the sole prop-
erty of that individual only.3 Additionally, the agreement required
plaintiff to transfer certain assets to himself and defendant jointly,
and to add defendant as a beneficiary on certain accounts and poli-
cies.4 Both parties expressly waived all rights to alimony and tem-
porary support or allowances pending a hearing for divorce or
other proceeding.5 By the terms of the antenuptial agreement, any
modification or waiver of any provisions of the agreement would be
effective only if executed in writing with the same formality as the
original.6
Approximately two months after his marriage to defendant,
plaintiff filed a petition for absolute divorce.7 Plaintiff sought an
equitable distribution of the assets of the marriage in accordance
with the equitable distribution statute.8 Defendant answered and
counterclaimed, seeking the same equitable distribution of the as-
sets per the statute.9 Defendant filed a motion for a temporary







8. Id.; see R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 (2001).
9. Id.
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restraining order (TRO) and temporary allowances on the same
day. It was only in this motion for the TRO that the antenuptial
agreement was mentioned and no request was made to enforce the
agreement's provisions by either party at this time.10
Prior to the Family Court divorce proceeding of January 6,
1999, various orders were signed restraining both parties from as-
saulting, molesting, or threatening each other, and from alienat-
ing, selling, or encumbering certain assets." Plaintiff was ordered
to withdraw $5,000 from a mutual account and to advance that
money to defendant as an advance on her award of equitable distri-
bution. 12 Also prior to the divorce proceeding, defendant filed a
complaint in the Superior Court requesting specific performance of
the antenuptial agreement, however a Family Court justice or-
dered this dismissed; subsequently, defendant filed an amended
counterclaim in the Family Court seeking the same.13
The sole issue at trial was whether the respective property
rights of the parties should be determined in accordance with the
equitable distribution statute or the antenuptial agreement signed
by the parties. In a motion in limine, plaintiff argued that defen-
dant was precluded from asserting rights under the antenuptial
agreement because she had accepted an advance payment based
upon her statutory right to equitable distribution, thereby waiving
her right to enforce the agreement.' 4 Despite initial support in
favor of defendant at trial, the Family Court justice later concluded
in a bench decision that defendant was precluded from enforcing
the provisions of the agreement because she accepted monetary
support as an advancement on equitable distribution and did so
one month after filing her counterclaim to enforce the contract. 15
The justice found defendant's actions to be in total violation of the
intent, spirit, and wording of the contract. In the divorce order, no
assets were distributed to either party due to the brevity of the






14. Id. at 1224.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On defendant's appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court de-
termined that the trial justice erred in concluding that defendant
had abandoned her rights under the antenuptial agreement due
only to her actions of filing a motion for, and accepting, $5,000 as
an advance equitable distribution of marital assets.17 The su-
preme court looked to the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
(Act)'8 and issues of statutory construction for guidance.
While the Act does not address the abandonment issue raised
by defendant, it does provide that an antenuptial agreement is en-
forceable unless the party against whom enforcement is sought
proves all of the enumerated elements of the Act, §§ 15-17-6(a)(1)
and (2), and does so by clear and convincing evidence. 19 Addition-
ally, § 15-17-5 of the Act provides that after marriage, antenuptial
agreements may only be amended or revoked by a written and
signed agreement.20 Based on accepted methods of statutory con-
struction such as examining the Act's provisions in their entirety,
attributing to the Act the meaning most consistent with the poli-
cies and purposes of the Legislature, 21 and giving words their plain
and ordinary meanings, 22 the supreme court found the agreement
17. Id. at 1225.
18. Id. at 1224-25. As codified in section 15-17-6, the Act provides that an
antenuptial agreement is enforceable unless the party against whom enforcement
is sought proves that:
(1) That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; and (2) The
agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execu-
tion of the agreement, that party: (i) Was not provided a fair and reasona-
ble disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party;
(ii) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclo-
sure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the
disclosure provided; and (iii) Did not have, or reasonably could not have
had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the
other party. (b) The burden of proof as to each of the elements required in
order to have [an antenuptial] agreement held to be unenforceable shall
be on the party seeking to have the agreement declared unenforceable and
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-17-6 (2001).
19. Id. at 1225.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing Commercial Union Insurance v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 681 (R.I.
1999) (quoting In re Advisory to the Governor (Judicial Nominating Commission),
668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I. 1996))).
22. Id. (citing Pelchat, 727 A.2d at 681 (quoting Matter of Flastaff Brewing
Corp., 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I. 1994))).
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controlling. Of particular guidance was the case of Penhallow v.
Penhallow,23 in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that
by enacting the specific provisions of the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act, the Legislature evidenced the intent to preserve
the validity and maintain the integrity of premarital agree-
ments. 24 Consequently, the party seeking to render the agreement
unenforceable is faced with a great burden by having to meet all
requirements of the Act.
The supreme court held that the antenuptial agreement, as
governed by the Act, should determine the rights and liabilities of
the parties, not the equitable distribution statute.26 Furthermore,
the plaintiff did not establish any elements required by the Act,
nor was there evidence that the parties ever signed a written
amendment or revocation to the original antenuptial agreement.26
Contrary to the trial judge's determination, the defendant did not
abandon her rights under this agreement despite both parties' use
of boilerplate language regarding equitable distribution. 27 Defen-
dant made specific attempts to enforce her rights under the agree-
ment both in Superior and Family Court. Therefore, the Supreme
Court sustained the defendant's appeal, reversed the Family Court
judgment, and remanded the case to enforce the parties' antenup-
tial agreement. 28
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a Family Court de-
cision that the rights and liabilities of a divorcing couple were gov-
erned by the equitable distribution statute rather than an
antenuptial agreement. Despite filing a motion for temporary or-
ders and accepting $5,000 from parties' joint account as an ad-
vance equitable distribution, the ex-wife did not abandon her
rights under the antenuptial agreement. The ex-husband failed to
establish any of the elements required under the Uniform Premar-
ital Agreement Act to render the agreement unenforceable, the
parties never signed a written agreement to revoke or amend the
23. 649 A.2d 1016, 1021 (R.I. 1994).




28. Id. at 1226.
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agreement, and the ex-wife had made specific attempts to enforce
her rights under the agreement.
Christy Hetherington
